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This paper presents a model on the demand for money market funds (MMFs). 
These funds are a very close substitute for M1 deposits, except that MMFs do not 
satisfy immediate transaction requirements. The demand for MMFs strengthens 
when the intended volume of transactions is low. A high interest rate level makes 
it expensive to hold M1 deposits. High interest rate volatility, paradoxically, 
increases the risk of holding M1 deposits stronger than the risk of holding MMFs. 
The results are largely corroborated by Finnish data. 
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Rahamarkkinarahastojen kysyntä 
Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
Keskustelualoitteita 14/2005 
Karlo Kauko 




Tässä keskustelualoitteessa esitetään rahamarkkinarahastojen kysyntää kuvaava 
malli. Nämä rahastot ovat muuten erittäin läheinen käyttelytilitalletusten substi-
tuutti, mutta rahamarkkinarahastoja ei voida käyttää maksuvälineinä. Raha-
markkinarahastojen kysyntä voimistuu, jos aiottu transaktioiden määrä on vähäi-
nen. Korkea korkotaso lisää käyttelytilitalletusten hallussapidon kustannuksia. 
Voimakas korkovolatiliteetti paradoksaalisesti lisää käyttelytilitalletusten riskiä 
enemmän kuin rahamarkkinarahastojen riskiä. Tulokset ovat suurelta osin sopu-
soinnussa suomalaisen aineiston kanssa. 
 
Avainsanat: rahamarkkinarahastot, rahan kysyntä 
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1.1  The development of Money market mutual funds 
Money market mutual funds (MMFs) invest in nothing but short maturity debt 
securities, such as treasury bills and certificates of deposit. These funds typically 
try to avoid default risk and prefer securities issued by low-risk debtors, such as 
the government. In Euro area monetary statistics these funds are classified as a 
component of the widest monetary aggregate M3. 
  Investments in Finnish MMFs have skyrocketed in the last few years. In May 
2005, these funds as a component of the national contribution to Euro area M3 
totalled EUR 11.3 billion, and they accounted for 12% of M3. In January 2000, 
the stock was just EUR 1.5 billion, about 2% of M3. The average annual growth 
rate has been almost 50%; it is difficult to mention any other economic variable 





This extreme growth has been above all a Finnish phenomenon. In the whole Euro 
area, the stock of MMFs grew between January 2000 and January 2005 by 43% 
only, which implies a relatively low average annual growth rate of 7%. 
  From a legal point of view, MMFs can be classified in the same category with 
other mutual funds. However, from an economic point of view, these funds have 
little in common with, say, equity funds characterised by high volatility and high 
potential returns. Instead, MMFs are a very close substitute for transaction  
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accounts. Both types of assets are characterised by low risk, high liquidity and 
low rate of return even though the return of MMFs has been higher than the rate 
of return on transaction accounts. MMFs are almost as liquid as M1 deposits; they 
can be sold any time within a couple of days, in most cases with no fees. 
Basically, MMFs serve all the purposes M1 deposits do, with the exception of 
immediate transaction needs. In Finland, MMFs cannot be used for giro payments 
and no checks can be drawn on them. 
  It is difficult to mention other assets characterised by such a combination of 
low risk and high liquidity, except notes and coins. Equities and equity funds bear 
a much higher market risk. Interest rate volatility affects the value of bonds and 
bond funds much stronger than the value of money market funds, implying a 
significantly higher level of interest rate risk. Time deposits are illiquid because of 
their fixed maturity. It may be possible to withdraw the money before the original 
maturity date, but not without costs, making time deposits a relatively poor 
substitute for M1 deposits, even though from a legal point of view all kinds of 
deposits are relatively similar debt contracts between licensed banks and their 
customers. 
  Because transaction accounts and MMFs are very close substitutes, it is 
meaningful to analyse the choice between them as a separate question. 
  The second section of this paper presents a model on the choice between these 
two monetary assets. The model is based on the idea that there are two differences 
between transaction accounts and MMFs; unlike M1 deposits, MMFs cannot be 
used for immediate transaction needs. Moreover, the return on MMFs is higher 
and it equals the money market rate. Paradoxically, it turns out that the overall 
interest rate risk of MMFs characterised by a very short maturity is lower than the 
interest rate risk of transaction deposits. 
  The third section presents some empirical analysis on the stock of these two 
monetary assets with Finnish monthly data. Most of the empirical predictions of 
the model are corroborated by the data, even though there seems to be no short-
term connection between economic activity and M1 deposits. The fourth section 
concludes the main findings. 
 
 
1.2  Previous literature on MMFs 
There is surprisingly little systematic research on the demand for MMFs. The 
existing empirical evidence focuses almost exclusively on the U.S. market, and it 
was almost exclusively published in the 1990s. It is difficult to identify in this 
literature any established schools or research traditions; there are no standard 
theories or hypotheses that would have been tested with different methods and  
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data sets. Neither are there controversies. Instead, there seems to be a relatively 
small number of almost non-related contributions. 
  A particularly detailed contribution has been presented by Farinella and Koch 
(1999); they analysed the impact of taxation and changes in regulations on the 
demand for different types of MMFs in the U.S. in 1984–1995. The demand for 
these funds was negatively related to the yields of government debt securities but 
positively related to the return on the funds themselves. The demand for MMFs 
does also depend on fund maturity, but the sign of this effect depends on the 
investor category. 
  Dow and Elmendorf (1998) studied the impact of stock price changes on the 
stock of MMFs. The results were somewhat surprising; both increases and 
decreases in stock prices intensified the demand for these funds, when compared 
to stable stock prices. The authors explain this observation by arguing that MMFs 
serve as a gateway between different asset classes. The argumentation may lack 
clarity, but the empirical results were rather clear. Goetzmann, Massa and 
Rouwenhorst (1999), instead, found that flows to equity funds are negatively 
correlated to flows to MMFs. Lam, Deb and Fomby (1989) concluded that 
deregulation of bank deposit rates in the U.S. in 1982 weakened the demand for 
MMFs because substitutes  with nearly similar return properties became available. 
  As to the supply side, Maggs (1991) estimated how the number of different 
MMFs offered to the public reacted to inter e s t  r a t e  c h a n g e s .  I t  s e e m e d  t h a t  
financial interediaries’ decision to launch new mutual funds reacted strongly to 
the highest treasury bill rate observed during the previous quarters. 
  There is some empirical research on the ability of money market fund 
managers to forecast changes in interest rates. Fund managers do not seem to be 
able to adjust portfolio maturities according to future changes in interest rates; in 
fact, portfolio maturities follow rather than anticipate interest rate changes. 
(Domian 1992) At least among large funds net returns to investors are driven 
almost exclusively by two factors, namely differences in expenses and the policy 





2 The  model 
2.1 Assumptions 
This model analyses the demand for two different monetary assets, namely M1 
deposits and their close substitute, MMFs. The model is a simple version of the 
money in utility function approach; holding money is costly, but agents prefer to 
keep a certain part of their assets as money because of the utility and services 
provided by monetary assets. M1 deposits provide agents with liquidity services, 
whereas MMFs do not. Money held for other motives, such as precautionary and 
speculative purposes, does also yield utility. In these other uses M1 deposits and 
MMFs are perfect substitutes. 
  All the agents incur a cost if they prefer to hold these monetary assets. The 
gross cost equals the money market rate (r) multiplied by the amount of assets 
held. The opportunity cost of holding monetary assets is the same irrespective of 
which kind of assets are being held. It would also be possible to assume that the 
cost must be somewhat higher than the mere money market rate because agents 
cannot borrow directly from the market, but as long as the margin between the 
cost and the market rate is constant, this would have basically no impact on the 
empirical predictions of the model. 
  No interest is paid on M1 deposits. The investments of MMFs, instead, earn 
the market rate, but there is a constant fee (f, 0 < f < 1) charged by the mutual 
fund company, implying that the net cost of holding MMFs equals f times the 
amount of MMFs being held. This assumption is consistent with the above 
mentioned observations by Domian (1992) and Domian & Reichenstein (1997). 
To keep things simple, it is assumed that the duration of the money market fund 
portfolio is 0, and there are neither capital losses nor gains when interest rates 
change. In practice, such short-term gains and losses do take place, but because 
the average duration of a money market fund portfolio is very short, this factor is 
negligible. 
  The objective function of each agent is 
 
] m m [ Ln )] z c ( m [ aLn U f 1 1 + + − ⋅ =  (2.1) 
 
where c is expenditure on consumption, m1 is the amount of M1 deposits, mf is 
the amount of money market funds and z (0 < z < 1) is an exogenously given 
minimum amount of consumption, such as the minimum level of subsistence. The 
parameter a describes agents’ preference for consumption. The first part of the 
expression describes utility from consumption and consumption related liquidity 
services, the latter part describes the utility from holding monetary assets for any 
purpose not related to immediate transaction needs.  
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  The sequential order is the following. 
 
1)  Agents observe the interest rate (r, 0  <  r  <  1). They do also observe their 
preferences concerning consumption, ie. the parameter a. 
2)  Agents borrow money at the money market rate. They decide how much to 
borrow and how to divide these funds between M1 deposits (m1) and money 
market funds (mf). 
3)  Transactions are made. Utility from consumption and services provided by 
monetary assets is accrued. 
4)  Agents get their income. The income equals +1. Agents have to repay their 
debts and to pay their interest and fee expenditures to lenders and mutual fund 
companies. Agents get the interest income from their holdings. 
 
This is a static model, and the above mentioned stages are repeated only once. 
  Consumption at stage (3) equals the difference between income and the net 
cost of holding monetary assets. Not being able to repay debts at the stage four 
causes serious disutility, and it cannot be optimal to default. By definition 
 
f 1 fm r m 1 c − − =  (2.2) 
 
 
2.2  Solving the model 
Substituting (2.2) for c in the equation (2.1), and differentiating with respect to m1 
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As can be seen, it is not possible to construct examples where agents would prefer 
to hold no M1 deposits at all. Instead, it is entirely possible to construct examples 
where there is no demand for money market funds. This outcome is consistent 
with the real world observation that not every household and business undertaking 
holds shares in money market funds. Such cases are likely if market rates are low, 
                                                 
1 Second order conditions 
∂
2U/∂m1
2 = -1/(m1 + mf)
2 - af
2/(1-fmf - m1r - z)






2/(1 - fmf - m1r - z)
2 < 0  
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which narrows the cost differential between money market funds and M1 
deposits, the fees charged by mutual fund companies (f) are high and the 
preference for consumption is strong (a>>0). Especially the latter factor may vary 
between agents. In the following, the analysis is restricted to cases where the 
optimal holdings of MMFs are positive {rm > f(1+a)}. 
  The formulae (2.3) imply that consumption expenditure equals 
 
) a 2 1 (




=  (2.4) 
 
With the formulae (2.3) it is possible to calculate how the optimal holdings of the 
two monetary assets react to changes in interest rates. 
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Unsurprisingly, the demand for money market funds increases and the demand for 
M1 deposits decreases when interest rates increase. The net cost of holding M1 
accounts increases, whereas the cost of holding money market funds remains 
constant in net terms, implying that it is rational to substitute money market funds 
for M1 deposits. Interestingly, the formula (2.4) implies that interest rates have no 
impact on consumption, and the only consequence is a reallocation between the 
two types of monetary assets. This is probably due to the lack of long-term saving 
decisions in a one period model. 
  It is equally easy to calculate how changes in the preference parameter a 
affect the demand for the two monetary assets. 
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This result is not particularly surprising. When agents’ preferences for 
consumption increase, they shift monetary assets from money market funds to 
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2.3  Interest rate volatility and the demand for monetary 
assets 
Now, the assumptions of the model are changed in the following way. At stage 1, 
agents observe nothing but the expected value of future interest rates (re). There 
are two possible interest rate realisations, re + v and re - v (v > 0). These outcomes 
are equally likely. The actual level of interest rates is observed between stages 2 
and 3; agents do not have this information when they decide how much M1 
deposits and MMFs to hold, but they know how much money is left for 
consumption when they decide their consumption expenditure at stage 3. If the 
interest rate happens to be high (re + v), they have to consume less because the 
chosen level of M1 deposits becomes more costly to hold. If, instead, the interest 
rate is low (re - v), agents can afford spending more at stage 3. 
  Agents maximise the expected value of utility W. 
  When the interest rate level is observed, agents realise that the amount of 
consumption they can afford equals 
 
) v r ( m fm 1 c e 1 f ± − − =  (2.8) 
 
Agents’ expected utility equals 
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These conditions yield the following optimal combination 
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=  (2.12) 
 
Unsurprisingly, if there is no interest rate uncertainty (v = 0), the formulae (2.11) 
and (2.12) reduce to the formulae (2.3). 
 
PROPOSITION: When interest rate uncertainty increases, agents prefer to hold 
more money market funds and less M1 deposits. (∂m1/∂v < 0; ∂mf/∂v > 0) 
 
PROOF: Appendix 1 
 
                                                 









2] < 0 
 
The expression for ∂
2W/∂m1
2 is extremely complicated, but the extreme value must be a maximum 
of utility because ∂W/∂m1 is a continuous function with meaningful values of m1, because the 
extreme value is unique and because of the following two reasons 
 
1) Lim ∂W/∂m1 = ∞; 
     m1→0 
 
2) When m1 approaches its theoretical maximum where nothing but the minimum sum z is spent 
on consumption with the high interest rate realisation (which implies infinite marginal utility of 
consumption) 
 
Lim W               = -∞ 
m1→(1-mf f –z)/(r+v) 
 
Therefore, the utility maximising value of m1 must lie between the two extremes.  
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This result has a simple intuition. Because agents are risk averse, (∂
2W/∂c
2 < 0), 
they become unwilling to hold risk bearing assets when the uncertainty related to 
them increases. Paradoxically, the overall interest rate risk of M1 deposits is 
higher than the risk of MMFs. The gross return on MMFs is volatile whereas the 
return on transaction accounts is not, but, on the other hand, agents’ willingness to 
hold different kinds of monetary assets depend on the net costs. Because there is a 
perfect correlation between the return on MMFs and the cost of holding them, 
they paradoxically turn out to be a safer investment than transaction deposits. 
 
 
3 Testing  the  model 
3.1 The  data 
The following analyses are based on monthly statistics on Finnish contribution to 
Euro area monetary aggregates. MMFs are measured with the respective 
component in Finnish MFIs’ contribution to the Euro area M3, and transaction 
accounts are measured by the respective contribution to Euro area M1. All the 
data are from the period January 2000 – March 2005, containing 63 monthly 
observations. 
  There is one clear seasonal pattern in the money market fund data. The stock 
of funds decreases sharply in December but recovers in January and February. 
This regularity has an obvious explanation, namely the wealth tax. Individuals’ 
wealth exceeding a certain relatively large sum was subject to a specific tax that 
was determined by the end of year situation. Not all the assets were taxable. 
Mutual fund shares were liable to taxation, but bank deposits were not. Hence, 
many wealthy individuals used to dispose of their mutual fund shares in 
December and reinvest in them in January or February. The wealth tax was 
abolished in 2005, but it was applicable during all the December observations of 
the data. The seasonal regularity can be dealt with in two different ways. Neither 
of them is fully satisfactory, but because of the extremely limited number of years 
in the data no good solution is available. 
 
–  First, the time series can be filtered with seasonal decomposition. The 
problem with this approach is the limited number of years in the data. One has 
to derive 12 scaling factors, one for each month. Each scaling factor is 
calculated as the average of differences of the variable from its centered 
moving average. This moving average cannot be calculated for the first six 
and the last six observations of the sample. Thus, the scaling factor is 
calculated as an average of very few observations.  
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–  The second possibility is to use a specific dummy variable for December, and 
possibly two or three of its lagged values. On the positive side, observations 
for most months of the year are not affected by the unreliable estimate for the 
monthly factor. On the negative side, this method ignores any other potential 
seasonal regularity. And as to Decembers, there are only five observations in 
the data, implying that it is still difficult to separate random variation from 
seasonal regularities. 
 
The results of preliminary estimations were fairly similar, irrespective of how the 
seasonal regularity of the explained variable is treated. There seemed to be more 
diagnostic problems, such as residual autocorrelation, when the raw data with a 
December dummy and its lagged values were used. Thus, the analyses to be 
presented in the following are based on MMF data which was deseasonalised with 
the additive method.
3 The highest deseasonalisation factor was 0.168 for 
December. All the observations were divided by the consumer price index and 
transformed by taking the logarithm before deseasonalisation. 
 Transaction  account  deposits held by the public are measured by M1 deposits. 
These data were logarithmic and transformed by dividing them with the consumer 
price index before taking the logarithm and deseasonalising. There does also seem 
to be some seasonal variation in M1 deposits. Fortunately, these data are available 
for a much longer period, and the deseasonalisation was done with monthly data 
for the period January 1990 – February 2005. 
  The three main explanatory variables suggested by the above model are 
included in the analysis. 
 
–  The Monthly Indicator of real GDP is used to measure economic activity. 
Even these data are real and deseasonalised. The deseasonalisation was done 
with logarithmic data for the period January 1990 – February 2005. 
–  The data set does also include data on three months Euribor rates. The 
observation refers to the last bank day of the month. 
–  The daily volatility of the three months Euribor rate during each month is 
used as a measure for volatility. 
 
In addition, the difference between the six months and three months Euribor rate 
(YSLOP) is used as a proxy for interest rate expectations. If the yield curve is 
steep, the market expects interest rates to rise. Rate changes in the Euro money 
market seem to have been relatively predictable (Bernoth & von Hagen 2004), 
implying that market expectations contain relevant information and rational 
agents react to them. How would agents react to anticipations about rising interest 
                                                 
3 Scaling factors; Jan +0.023; Feb +0.008; March +0.018; Apr -0.012; May -0.018; June -0.021; 
July -0.041; Aug -0.031; Sept -0.025; -Oct 0.045; Nov -0.025; Dec +0.168.  
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rates? There are two different possibilities. If the duration of the MMF portfolio is 
0, the situation is straightforward; higher future interest rates mean nothing but 
higher future revenue, and it is fully rational to invest more in MMFs immediately 
as a reaction to the anticipated rate change. On the other hand, rising interest rates 
would also imply one-off capital losses because the duration of the portfolio is at 
least a few weeks. This latter effect, however, would be of no importance in an 
efficient market because there should be no anticipated market rate changes that 
would enable investors to benefit from abnormal capital gains; whenever a rate 
change becomes evident, it is reflected in the prices of all the securities that will 
arrive at maturity after the anticipated rate change. 
  The return on stock investments is used as a control variable in the equation 
for MMFs. As Dow and Elmendorf (1998) did in their paper on MMFs, changes 
in stock returns are split into two variables. The first one (HEXUP) is the percent 
change of the Helsinki Stock Exchange HEX portfolio return index, if the return is 
positive, zero otherwise. The second one (HEXDWN) is the absolute value of the 
percent change if the change is negative, zero otherwise. 
  The impact of interest rate volatility on money demand has been studied in 
previous research. Slovin and Sushka (1983) suggested that agents may hold less 
debt securities and more narrowly defined money if the return on securities is 
uncertain because of interest rate volatility. On the other hand, the results of 
Choudhry (1999) imply that interest rate volatility decreases rather than increases 
the demand for money. Roughly the same result was valid irrespective of whether 
the tests were made with short or long rate variability, even though the impact of 
short rate volatility on M1 demand was stronger. Hence, in the following, the long 
rate volatility, measured by the daily bond rate volatility during the month, is used 
as an additional control variable. The bond rate is the quotation of a domestic 
government bond with 10 years of remaining maturity. 
  The appropriate method to be used in testing the model depends on the time 
series properties of the key variables. In the following table, the unit root test 
results of the variables to be used in the estimations are presented. As we can see, 
the only variables that clearly violate the unit root hypothesis are the volatilities. 
Perhaps surprisingly, even the three months Euribor rate seems to have been a unit 
root process during the observation period. 
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Table 1.   Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics 
 
 Lag  length 
(Automatic 
based on SIC, 
MAXLAG=11) t-Statistic Prob.* 
LNRMMFS 1  -0.210  0.931 
D(LNRMMFS) 0 -10.641  0.000 
LNRM1S 3  0.133  0.973 
D(LNRM1S) 1  -3.523  0.011 
EURIB3 1  -0.897  0.784 
D(EURIB3) 1  -4.744  0.000 
RB 0  -1.162  0.687 
D(RB) 0  -7.182  0.000 
LN(VOLA) 0  -5.615  0.000 
LN(BVOLA) 0 -4.350  0.001 
YSLOP 0  -2.901  0.051 
D(YSLOP) 0  -10.994  0.000 
LNYS 2  -0.828  0.805 
D(LNYS) 1  -13.204  0.000 
 
      Unit root tests of key variables and their differences; 
LNRMFS = Ln[(Stock of MMFs, end of month)/(consumer 
price index)], deseasonalised; LNR1S = Ln (M1 deposits, 
end of month/consumer price index), deseasonalised; 
EURIB3 = 3 months Euribor rate, last bank day of the 
month; RB = 10 years govnmnt bond yield, last bank day 
of the month; LN(VOLA) = Ln (standard deviation of the 
daily returns on a 3 month money market investment 
during the month); LN(BVOLA) = Ln(standard deviation 
during the month of the daily returns on a govnmnt bond 
with 10 years of remaining maturity); LNYS = Ln(Monthly 
series of real GDP), deseasonalised; YSLOP = the 
difference between the 6 and 3 months Euribor rate. 
      * MacKinnon one-sided p-values 
 
 
There seemed to be no seasonal regularities in the volatility variables. When their 
logarithmic values were explained with their lagged values and dummy variables 





The following two equations have been estimated with OLS. Because most of the 
variables are unit root processes rather than stationary variables, most of them are  
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used as first differences in the analysis. First, all the above discussed variables 
were included as explanatory variables, but non-significant variables not central to 
the above model were dropped off. Moreover, lagged values of differences of the 
explained variable were also included as explanatory variables. The resulting 
equations are presented in the Appendix 2. As a second step all the clearly non-
significant variables not central to the model described in the second section were 
dropped off. The resulting equations are presented in the table 2. 
 






LNRM1S(-1) Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.0675 1.2966 0.1977
LNYS(1)-LNYS 0.1687 1.1404 0.2568
LNYS-LNYS(-1) 0.0541 0.3731 0.7099
LN(VOLA) -0.0089 -1.7958 0.0755
LN(BVOLA) 0.0168 1.8738 0.0638
EURIB3-EURIB3(-1) -0.0387 -1.9561 0.0532
LNRM1S(-1)-LNRM1S(-2) -0.5363 -3.8178 0.0002
LNRM1S(-2)-LNRM1S(-3) -0.3157 -2.2301 0.0280
LNRM1S(-3)-LNRM1S(-4) 0.2103 1.6126 0.1100
R-squared 0.512264     Mean dependent var 0.00221
Adjusted R-squared 0.435757     S.D. dependent var 0.023663
S.E. of regression 0.017775     Sum squared resid 0.016113
EQUATION FOR LNRMMFS-
LNRMMFS(-1) Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.1477 4.2470 0.0000
LNYS(1)-LNYS -0.5200 -2.3575 0.0203
LN(VOLA) 0.0491 3.9704 0.0001
YSLOP-YSLOP(-1) 0.1539 1.2484 0.2148
HEXUP 0.4002 2.4823 0.0147
RB-RB(-1) -0.0458 -1.6792 0.0962
EURIB3-EURIB3(-1) 0.0428 0.7303 0.4669
EURIB3(-1)-EURIB3(-2) -0.0519 -0.9823 0.3283
LNRMMFS(-1)-LNRMMFS(-2) -0.3019 -2.7411 0.0072
TREND 0.0010 2.6348 0.0097
R-squared 0.493294     Mean dependent var 0.029965
Adjusted R-squared 0.402086     S.D. dependent var 0.044677




The correlation between regression residuals of the two equations is -0.291, which 
is statistically significant at the 5% level. This negative correlation is probably an 
indicator of the mutual substitutability of these two monetary assets. Because of 
this correlation it is reasonable to use the SUR estimation technique instead of 
OLS. The results are presented in the table 3. Unsurprisingly, the results are fairly 
similar to the OLS results. 
 
Table 3.   SUR results 
 
Estimation Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Sample: 2000M03 2005M02
Included observations: 60
Total system (balanced) observations 120
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
EQUATION FOR LNRM1S-
LNRM1S(-1) Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.0785 1.6863 0.0948
LNYS(1)-LNYS 0.1249 0.9326 0.3533
LNYS-LNYS(-1) 0.0152 0.1176 0.9066
LN(VOLA) -0.0096 -2.1012 0.0381
LN(BVOLA) 0.0191 2.3901 0.0187
EURIB3-EURIB3(-1) -0.0380 -2.0929 0.0389
LNRM1S(-1)-LNRM1S(-2) -0.5802 -4.6545 0.0000
LNRM1S(-2)-LNRM1S(-3) -0.3304 -2.6358 0.0097
LNRM1S(-3)-LNRM1S(-4) 0.2112 1.8172 0.0722
R-squared 0.51002     Mean dependent var 0.00221
Adjusted R-squared 0.433161     S.D. dependent var 0.023663
S.E. of regression 0.017816     Sum squared resid 0.016187
EQUATION FOR LNRMMFS-
LNRMMFS(-1) Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.1494 4.7531 0.0000
LNYS(1)-LNYS -0.5022 -2.5114 0.0136
LN(VOLA) 0.0520 4.7008 0.0000
YSLOP-YSLOP(-1) 0.1218 1.1180 0.2662
HEXUP 0.4342 3.0803 0.0027
RB-RB(-1) -0.0382 -1.5922 0.1145
EURIB3-EURIB3(-1) 0.0597 1.1428 0.2558
EURIB3(-1)-EURIB3(-2) -0.0690 -1.4865 0.1403
LNRMMFS(-1)-LNRMMFS(-2) -0.2873 -2.9670 0.0038
TREND 0.0011 3.5158 0.0007
R-squared 0.488052     Mean dependent var 0.029965
Adjusted R-squared 0.395901     S.D. dependent var 0.044677
S.E. of regression 0.034725     Sum squared resid 0.06029
Determinant residual covariance 2.40E-07   
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As can be seen in the appendix 3, there is no sign of obvious diagnostic problems 
in the estimations, such as residual autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity or non-
normality. 
  Most empirical predictions of the model are consistent with estimation results. 
 
1)  Short rate volatility increases the demand for MMFs but decreases the 
demand for M1 deposits. The effect is surprisingly strong in the case of 
MMFs. 
2)  The demand for MMFs depends negatively on economic activity of the near 
future. Past volume of economic activity is less relevant than future activity, 
which is consistent with the idea that liquidity is invested in MMFs when it is 
not intended to be used for transaction purposes in the near future. 
3) High money market rates decrease the demand for M1 deposits and 
anticipations of high future interest rates strengthen the demand for MMFs, 
which is consistent with the model. 
 
When agents decide about their investments in MMFs, their decisions seem to be 
forward looking. They react to planned or expected volumes of activity and to 
interest rate expectations rather than past developments. In the case of M1 
deposits, instead, the past seems to be at least as relevant as the future. This may 
reflect differences in the composition of agents who invest in these assets. The 
relative share of unsophisticated agents, such as poorly informed households, is 
probably larger among depositors than among MMF investors. 
 Perhaps  surprisingly,  the  only empirical prediction of the model that finds no 
support in these results is the positive relationship between M1 deposits and the 
economic activity. However, there is previous empirical evidence in favour of the 
positive relationship between these two variables (see Ripatti 1998 for analysis 
with Finnish data), and it is possible that the lack of evidence is simply due to the 
limited number of observations and the strong focus on very short-term 
developments. 
  One surprising finding related to money demand is the very strong negative 
impact of past changes in the stock of M1 deposits; it seems that almost 70% of 
any short-term change in the stock of M1 deposits is eliminated within three 
months. There is a similar yet much weaker negative autocorrelation in the 
changes of the MMF stock. 
  The very strong statistical evidence of the trend variable in the MMF equation 
indicates that, if anything, the growth rate of MMFs has been accelerating during 
the observation period, and there is no evidence that the stock of MMFs would 
already be stabilising at an equilibrium level. 
  Because most key variables of the model are unit root processes, it might be 
interesting to analyse the existence of co-integrating relationships between them. 
However, in the light of preliminary experiments, it does not seem to be possible  
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to find such relationships, at least not if the trend variable is omitted. If the trend 
variable is included, the Johansen procedure finds a relationship between the 3 
months Euribor rate and the stock of MMFs, but there is little or no evidence on 
the relationship between MMFs and other interesting variables, such as the GDP 
series and the stock of M1 deposits. This may not be surprising because the 
extreme growth rate of MMFs probably indicates that this variable is still 




This paper presents a simple model to analyse the demand for M1 deposits and 
MMFs. MMFs are a close substitute for M1 deposits because they are highly 
liquid and bear a very low risk. However, MMFs cannot be used for immediate 
transaction needs as a payment medium. Instead, the return on MMFs is 
somewhat higher. Agents prefer to hold more MMFs instead of transaction 
deposits if the intended volume of transactions is low and if the cost of holding 
monetary assets, ie the money market rate, is high and volatile. Perhaps 
surprisingly, MMFs with variable rate of return bear a lower overall risk than 
fixed rate deposits. This paradoxical result is valid if the cost of holding monetary 
assets equals the money market rate, which is also the rate of return on the 
investments of the typical MMF. 
  Most of the empirical predictions of the model find support in both OLS and 
SUR analysis with first differences of the key variables. Interestingly, 
anticipations about future money market rates seem to affect the demand for 
MMFs, but there is little evidence that past changes would have much effect. This 
finding is consistent with the statement that changes in the short market rate have 
been predictable and agents have often reacted to changes in interest rates before 
they have taken place. Short rate volatility and slowing economic activity 
intensify the demand for MMFs. The results of Dow and Elmendorf (1998) were 
partly corroborated; strongly positive stock returns strengthen the demand for 
MMFs. On the other hand, there seems to be no evidence of the impact of 
negative returns. 
  Perhaps surprisingly, previous results on the impact of economic activity on 
the demand for M1 deposits are not corroborated by the analysis. At least as to 
reactions to interest rates, agents seem to be more forward looking in their choice 
of holding MMFs. The empirical results are strong, but they are based on a 
relatively short sample from one country. Therefore, it would be interesting to test 
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Proof of the proposition 
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If ) f r ( v e − = , the left hand side of (A1.2) equals 0. 
  When the expression on the left side of the inequality sign of (A1.2) is 
differentiated with respect to v, one gets 64v
3 - 64(re-f)
2v. Iff v  <  (re-f), as 
assumed, this derivative is negative, implying that the left hand side of (A1.2) is 
positive and ∂mf/∂v > 0 whenever v < (re-f).
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If v = (re-f), the expression (A1.3) equals 0. 
  The expression (A1.3) is negative iff 
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If v = (re-f), the left hand side of (A1.4) equals 0. 
                                                 
4 In fact, the inequality (A1.2) would hold even when v > re-f because beyond the point where 
v = re-f the left hand side of (A1.2) is an increasing function of v. When v = re-f, the left had side 
of (A1.2) reaches its extreme (minimum) value because the derivative with respect to v equals 
zero.  
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  When the left hand side of (A1.4) is differentiated with respect to v, one gets 
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This is negative because by assumption v  <  re-f, implying that (A1.4) is a 
declining function of the parameter v and the inequality (A1.4) is satisfied always 










                                                 
5 In fact, the inequality (A1.4) would hold even when v > re-f because beyond the point where 
v = re-f the left hand side of (A1.4) is an increasing function of v. When v = re-f, the left had side 
of (A1.4) reaches its minimum value because the derivative with respect to v equals zero.  
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Appendix 2 
All the explanatory variables included 
Estimation Method: Least Squares
Sample: 2000M03 2005M02
Included observations: 60
Total system (unbalanced) observations 120
Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.0198 0.3203 0.7494
LNYS(1)-LNYS 0.1711 1.1338 0.2598
LNYS-LNYS(-1) 0.1265 0.8288 0.4094
LOG(VOLA) -0.0053 -0.8210 0.4138
LOG(BVOLA) 0.0087 0.8270 0.4104
EURIB3-EURIB3(-1) -0.0454 -1.8530 0.0671
LNRM1S(-1)-LNRM1S(-2) -0.5814 -3.7537 0.0003
LNRM1S(-2)-LNRM1S(-3) -0.3405 -2.2775 0.0251
LNRM1S(-3)-LNRM1S(-4) 0.1439 1.0303 0.3055
LNRMMFS(-1)-LNRMMFS(-2) 0.0466 0.7431 0.4593
HEXUP 0.0418 0.4460 0.6566
HEXDWN -0.0342 -0.4299 0.6683
RB-RB(-1) 0.0223 1.5216 0.1315
TREND 0.0003 1.5412 0.1267
R-squared 0.567339     Mean dependent var 0.00221
Adjusted R-squared 0.445066     S.D. dependent var 0.023663
S.E. of regression 0.017628     Sum squared resid 0.014294
Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.291541 2.499857 0.0142
(LNYS(1)-LNYS) -0.776719 -2.806767 0.0061
(LNYS-LNYS(-1)) -0.264143 -0.978362 0.3305
LOG(VOLA) 0.04992 3.976311 0.0001
LOG(BVOLA) 0.025899 1.313046 0.1924
(YSLOP-YSLOP(-1)) 0.127509 2.007006 0.0477
HEXUP 0.538145 3.011615 0.0034
HEXDWN 0.0386 0.240808 0.8102
RB-RB(-1) -0.081241 -2.501961 0.0141
EURIB3-EURIB3(-1) 0.095862 1.544957 0.1258
EURIB3(-1)-EURIB3(-2) -0.072557 -1.313968 0.1921
LNRMMFS(-1)-LNRMMFS(-2) -0.415018 -3.510427 0.0007
TREND 0.001092 3.029493 0.0032
LNRM1S(-1)-LNRM1S(-2) -0.309393 -1.261561 0.2103
R-squared 0.558811     Mean dependent var 0.029965
Adjusted R-squared 0.434127     S.D. dependent var 0.044677











Heteroscedasticity ARCH Test; Squared residual regressed on 
four lagged squared residuals; R2*Nr of 
observations 5.908 6.189
Prob, based on chi squared 0.206 0.185
Autocorrelation Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
Residual regressed on four lagged residuals 
and explanatory variables of original 
regression; R2*Nr of observations 5.880 3.831
Prob, based on chi squared 0.208 0.429
Residual normality Jarque-Bera 1.132 0.496
Prob 0.568 0.781




Heteroscedasticity ARCH Test; Squared residual regressed on 
four lagged squared residuals; R2*Nr of 
observations 3.294 6.367
Prob, based on chi squared 0.510 0.173
Autocorrelation Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
Residual regressed on four lagged residuals 
and explanatory variables of original 
regression; R2*Nr of observations 4.313 8.535
Prob, based on chi squared 0.365 0.074
Residual normality Jarque-Bera 1.016 0.053
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